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Abstract:  Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have 
enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending.  While there is substantial 
variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, by 
lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or 
restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. Empirical results show that the 
typical local predatory lending law tends to reduce rejections, while having little impact on the 
flow (application and origination) of credit.  However, the strength of the law, measured by the 
extent of market coverage and the extent of prohibitions, can have strong impacts on both the 
flow of credit and rejections. 
 
JEL Classifications:  G21, C25 
Keywords:  Mortgages, Predatory, Laws, Subprime  
  
Introduction 
The current mortgage market consists primarily of two segments – the prime market and the 
subprime market.  The prime market extends credit to the majority of households.  The 
subprime market provides more expensive credit to households who do not qualify for a 
prime mortgage.  These households tend to be less financially secure and located in low-
income areas and areas with a concentration of minorities.  The combination of higher 
borrower costs and higher rates of delinquency and foreclosure have led to public policy 
concerns over fairness and accessibility of credit. 
 
Subprime lending represents an opportunity for the mortgage market to extend the possibility 
of home ownership beyond traditional barriers.  These barriers have existed because the prime 
segment of the mortgage market uses lending standards (credit scores and documented 
employment history, income, and wealth, among other factors) to accept or reject loan 
applicants.  Applicants that are rejected or expect to be rejected can look to the more 
expensive subprime market.  In this fashion the subprime market completes the mortgage 
market and can be welfare enhancing (Chinloy and MacDonald [4]) because it provides the 
opportunity of home ownership to a larger portion of the population.   
 
Over the past ten years subprime lending has grown rapidly -- from $65 billion to $332 billion 
of originations from 1995 through 2003 (Inside Mortgage Finance [17]).
1  According to the 
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, the rate that loans were in foreclosure from the 
                                                 
1 These numbers are derived from type B&C loans.  B&C loans are loans with less than an A (or prime) rating.  
See the Mortgage Markets Statistics Annual published by Inside Mortgage Finance for more details on loan 
classification schemes. 
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first quarter of 1998 to the third quarter of 2004 rose by more than 400 percent for subprime 
loans while declining by approximately 25 percent for prime loans.  In addition, during the 
same time period anecdotal evidence of predatory lending in the subprime market was gaining 
more public and regulatory attention.
2  Therefore, the welfare benefit associated with 
increased access to credit is believed to have been reduced by some unscrupulous lending in 
the subprime mortgage market.   
 
In response to public concerns of predation in the subprime mortgage market, federal 
regulations generated under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) 
restrict some types of high-cost lending.  Many states, cities, and counties have used HOEPA 
as a template and have extended the restrictions on credit to an even broader class of 
mortgages.  These restrictions include limits on allowable prepayment penalties and balloon 
payments, prohibitions of joint financing of various insurance products (credit, life, 
unemployment, etc), and requirements that borrowers participate in loan counseling.    
 
By introducing geographically defined predatory lending laws, policymakers have conducted 
a natural experiment with well defined control and treatment groups.  Since state boundaries 
reflect political and not economic regions, we can compare mortgage market conditions in 
states with a law in effect
3 (the treatment group) to those in neighboring states currently 
without a predatory lending law (the control group).  However, instead of examining whole 
states we focus on households that are geographically close to each other (border counties) 
and as a result are in similar labor and housing markets.   
                                                 
2 See HUD-Treasury report (HUD-Treasury [16]) and Federal Reserve HOEPA Final Rule (Federal Reserve [8]). 
3 Laws are first enacted by the local legislature and become effective typically at a later date.  It is not until the 
law becomes in effect that lenders are required to follow the new rules and restrictions. 
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Data at the individual loan level are used to identify the impact of local predatory lending 
laws on subprime applications, originations, and rejections.  Specifically, we find that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the response of the mortgage market to local predatory lending 
laws.  In fact, in contrast to previous research on the impact of the North Carolina law, the 
flow of subprime credit can increase, decrease, or be unaffected by the laws.  To help 
understand this heterogeneity we create an index that measures the strength of the local 
predatory laws.  This index measures the increase in market coverage and the extent that 
certain lending practices and mortgage types are restricted.   
 
This paper provides at least four contributions to the literature: (i) a wide variety of local 
predatory lending laws are characterized, (ii) the question of whether the market response in 
North Carolina (reduce flow of credit) was typical or atypical is examined, (iii) the 
importance of the strength of the law on the flow of credit is examined and (iv) the probability 
of a state introducing a predatory lending law is treated as jointly determined with the flow of 
subprime credit. 
A Simple Model of Application Outcomes 
We present a highly stylized model of mortgage application outcomes to examine the 
potential effects of a predatory lending law on subprime applications, subprime originations, 
and subprime rejections.  We assume that applicants understand that a subprime mortgage 
costs more than a prime mortgage and self-select their applications to the appropriate market.    
Following the approach of Ferguson and Peters [9] and Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and 
Yezer [2], we assume that all of the information included in the application can be 
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summarized by a single number (mortgage credit score or credit risk).  Each loan applicant 
has a credit risk represented by .  We interpret Φ as a monotonically increasing 
function of the borrower’s likelihood of default, and the marginal probability density function 
of credit risk is given by .  Assuming mortgage lenders can observe the true credit risk of 
borrowers, they approve all loan applications with credit risk lower than a uniform 
underwriting cut-off, which we denote as
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ Φ
) (Φ r
P Φ for the prime market and 
S Φ  for the subprime 
market, with  . 
S P Φ < Φ
 
In this model the prime market is perfectly sorted; everyone who applies for a prime mortgage 
has credit risk  and therefore is approved for a loan. While we do observe in the 
marketplace some rejections of prime applications, empirical research has shown that 
subprime loans are rejected at a much higher rate than prime loans: 33 percent versus 9 
percent (Scheessele [24]). In addition, the assumption of perfect sorting or borrower self-
selection does not affect the suggested impact of predatory lending laws on the outcome of 
subprime mortgage applications. Therefore, in Figure 1, prime applications and originations 
are given by the same integral of the marginal density function and are represented by the 
area : 




Φ Φ = =
P
d r O A
P P
0
) (  .  (1) 
Applicants with credit risk higher than the prime underwriting standard,
P Φ , are subprime 
applications. However, applying for a subprime loan is costly, so that an individual will do so 
only if he/she thinks the chance of being accepted is sufficiently high. 
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Figure 1: Prime and Subprime Mortgage Outcomes  
 
 
) (Φ r = marginal probability function of credit risk;  = subprime application rate;  = prime 
underwriting standard;  = subprime underwriting standard;  = prime originations;  = subprime 
originations; 
) ; (





S R = subprime rejections. 
 
This borrower self-selection implies that a fraction of individuals with credit risk higher than 
a certain level – we refer to these as the “marginal applicants” - will opt out of the subprime 
market, effectively altering the risk distribution. We define  as the share of actual 
subprime applicants in the potential applicant universe; α is indexed by Φ, given the current 
subprime underwriting standard ( ).  For potential subprime applicants with , 
 equals unity.  The probability of applying, , continuous and decreasing 
for   until it equals zero at some value 
) ; (
S Φ Φ α
S Φ
S Φ ≤ Φ
) ; (
S Φ Φ α ) ; (
S Φ Φ α
S Φ > Φ ' Φ , where  1 '≤ Φ < Φ
S . The applicants who opt 
out and do not apply are shown as the shaded area in Figure 1.   
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Given the current subprime underwriting standard,
S Φ , and the risk distribution, , the 
number of applications, 
) (Φ r
S A , originations,  , and rejections,
S O
S R , are shown in Figure 1 and 
given by  
Applications ;   ∫
Φ
Φ Φ Φ Φ =
1












Rejections  . (2)  ∫
Φ
Φ Φ Φ Φ =
1




The number of applications can also be represented as the sum of originations and 
rejections, .   
S S S R O A + =
 
Assume that a predatory lending law is introduced which imposes restrictions on subprime 
mortgage lenders in terms of information disclosure, allowable loan types, and required 
lending practices.  In order to comply with the law’s restrictions, lenders must tighten 
underwriting standards from   to
S Φ
' S Φ . This post-law scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.   T
law results in fewer subprime loans being originated due to the tighter minimum lending 












d r O O d r




The total number of subprime applicants also decreased after the law was implemented 
because more “marginal applicants”, fearing higher probability of rejection, self-select out of 
the subprime market.  For all values of 
' S Φ > Φ ,  , and, as a 
result,
) ; ( ) ( ) ; ( ) (
' S S r r Φ Φ Φ > Φ Φ Φ α α
' S S A A > . 
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Figure 2: Post-law Scenario – Tightening Subprime Underwriting Standards 
 
) (Φ r = marginal probability function of credit risk;  = subprime application rate;  = prime 
underwriting standard;  = pre-law subprime underwriting standard; 
) ; (
' S Φ Φ α
P Φ
S Φ
' S Φ = post-law subprime underwriting 
standard;  = prime originations;  = post-law subprime originations; 
P O
' S O
' S R = post-law subprime rejections.  
 
Depending on the functional form of  () . α  the number of rejected applications could increase 
or decrease if lending standards are tightened, especially if the propensity to apply is affected 
by the level of credit risk.
4   
∫ ∫
Φ Φ




) ; ( ) ( , , ) ; ( ) (
' S S
d r R R d r
S S S S α α . (4)   
In addition, the rejection rate or the ratio of rejections to applications could either increase or 
decrease, again depending on the function from of  () . α .   
 
                                                 
4 However, if  () . α  is a linear decreasing function of ( )
j Φ − Φ  , where is j indexes the lending standards 
and , the number of rejected applications will increase when lending standards are tightened.  S S′
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This analysis allows us to develop testable hypotheses regarding the impact of a predatory 
lending law on subprime mortgage outcomes. Specifically, we expect that the introduction of 
a law will reduce relative to prime market the number of subprime applications and 
originations.  In addition, a law that tightens lending standards should also be associated with 
higher rates of subprime rejections.   
 
Finally, we introduce what we call the “lemons effect,” as pioneered by Akerlof [1], into the 
market for subprime mortgage.  In this type of market loans can be sold honestly or 
dishonestly.  The borrower attempts to sort the honest loans from the dishonest loans.  
Unfortunately, regulatory agencies (HUD and Treasury) and The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (Board) did find some evidence from task force interviews and open 
meetings that some subprime borrowers, typically elderly or poorly educated households, 
have had difficulty sorting the honest loans from the dishonest loans (HUD-Treasury [16]
5 
and Federal Reserve [8]).   
 
In a market with some dishonest loans, all borrowers must exert extra effort and time to 
screen the lender and loan documents, but this represents extra costs (transaction costs) for the 
borrowers.  In addition, the press, government reports, and local nonprofit agencies, have 
informed the public about the presence of predatory lending, or dishonest loans, in the 
subprime market.  This uncertainty in loan quality can have the effect of deterring subprime 
applications and is illustrated in Figure 3.  
                                                 
5 The report recommended improved consumer literacy and disclosures, as well as prohibitions of loan flipping, 
lending without regard to ability to repay, and the sale of life credit insurance and other similar products.  It was 
also recommended that potentially abusive terms and conditions such as balloon payments, prepayment 
penalties, excessive fees and points be restricted. 
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Figure 3: The “Lemons Effect”  
 
) (Φ r = marginal probability function of credit risk;  = lemons shift function;  = 
subprime application rate;  = prime underwriting standard; 
) ; (
P Φ Φ Λ ) ; (
S Φ Φ α
P Φ
S Φ = subprime underwriting standard;  = 
prime originations;  = subprime originations under the lemons effect; 
P O
L S O
L S R = subprime rejections under the 
lemons effect.  
 
Here we introduce a shift function   that equals zero for  ) ; (
P Φ Φ Λ
P Φ ≤ Φ  and a constant k, 
, for  .   can be interpreted as the fraction of potential subprime 
applicants that are deterred from applying for fear of falling prey to predatory lending or 
because of the additional transaction costs associated with identifying the dishonest loan or 
lender.  Therefore, the risk distribution becomes kinked at
1 0 < < k 1 ≤ Φ < Φ
P (.) Λ
P Φ  and shifts down for all 
applicants with credit risk above . The resulting subprime originations and rejections are 
represented in Figure 3 by areas   and
P Φ
L S O
L S R , respectively, and subprime applications 
equal . 
L L S S R O +
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Given the perception that predation has occurred in the subprime market and not in the prime 
market, the volume of lending as measured by the number of originations and applications 
may be lower than expected, given the distribution of credit risk,  ) (Φ r .  One of the primary 
purposes of predatory lending laws is to weed out the “lemons” in the subprime mortgage 
market.  If households feel that the predatory lending law has been successful, there may be 
less need to spend time and energy to identify the dishonest loans and other households may 
feel more comfortable applying for a mortgage; in this scenario  (.) Λ is reduced to zero or 
much closer to zero.  Therefore, if the subprime market is operating as a lemons market the 
introduction of the predatory lending law should have two countervailing forces.  First, as 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the law should reduce applications and originations because of 
tighter lending standards. Second, as illustrated in Figure 3, the law should induce potential 
applicants back into the market; If the law removes or heavily regulates the dishonest loans 
there would be little or no fear of being taken advantage of and no need to expend effort 
sorting honest loans from dishonest loans.  Therefore, in markets with a substantial lemons 
problem, or big , the impact of a predatory lending law could be neutral or could increase 
the rate of subprime application and origination.  In addition, if 
(.) Λ
(.) Λ  is not strictly 
proportional, but has a larger impact on potential borrowers closer or farther away from 
S Φ , 
then the introduction of a predatory lending law could also increase or decrease rejections 
rates. 
National Lending Restrictions – Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
Congress enacted HOEPA (Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 21600) by amending the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA, 15 U.S.C 1601).  In 1994, the Board of Governors implemented HOEPA 
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through 12 CFR part 226 (Regulation Z), which articulates specific rules governing lending 
practices.   
 
HOEPA and the regulations promulgated under it define a class of loans that are given special 
consideration.  HOEPA-covered loans (loans where HOEPA applies) include only closed-end 
home equity loans that meet APR and finance fee triggers. Home purchase loans and other 
types of lending backed by a home, such as lines of credit, are not covered by HOEPA.  The 
original version, in 1994, set out the framework and defined the triggers and restrictions.  The 
second version, in 2002, adjusted some of the triggers and restricted some additional 
practices.  In the 2002 version, HOEPA protections were triggered in one of two ways: (i) if 
the loan’s APR exceeded the rate for Treasury securities of comparable maturity by 8 
percentage points or more on the first lien and 10 percentage points or higher on higher liens 
or (ii) if finance charges, including points and fees paid at closing for optional insurance 
programs and other debt protection programs, were greater than 8 percent of the loan amount 
or a fixed $480 amount indexed annually to the consumer price index. 
 
For HOEPA-covered loans, creditors were not allowed to provide short-term balloon notes, 
impose prepayment penalties greater than five years, use non-amortizing schedules, make no-
documentation loans, refinance loans into another HOEPA loan in the first 12 months, or 
impose higher interest rate upon default.  In addition, creditors were not allowed to habitually 
engage in lending that did not take into account the ability of the consumer to repay the loan.   
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Regional Restrictions – State and Local Predatory Lending Laws 
A number of states and local municipalities have sought to impose restrictions on predatory 
lending that reach further than HOEPA and Regulation Z. Ho and Pennington-Cross [15] 
provide a detailed description of each law in Appendix A.
6
 
Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, at least 23 states have passed predatory lending laws 
that are currently in effect: including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, and Wisconsin.   
 
Both the original and the 2002 versions of HOEPA defined a class of high-cost refinance 
mortgages that were subject to special restrictions.  The state laws tend to follow this lead and 
expand the definition of covered loans.  For example, North Carolina – the first state to enact 
predatory lending restrictions -- includes both closed-end and open-end mortgages but not 
reverse mortgages and limits loan size to the conventional conforming limit (loans small 
enough to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore not considered part of 
the jumbo market). HOEPA covers only those closed-end loans that are not for home 
purchase (typically refinance and second mortgages). North Carolina did leave the APR 
triggers the same as the HOEPA triggers, although the points and fees triggers were reduced 
from the HOEPA 8 percent of total loan amount to 5 percent for loans under $20,000. For 
                                                 
6 Every attempt was made to include all laws in effect by the end of 2004 that, similar to HOEPA, use triggers to 
define a class of loans eligible for restrictions and disclosures.  Because other laws are likely to exist, those 
discussed here should be viewed as a sample of all the state and local predatory lending laws. Other states have 
laws that do not focus on high-cost or subprime lending and do not have any triggers (Idaho, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia).  
  12 
loans $20,000 or larger, the same 8 percent trigger is used or $1,000, whichever is smaller. 
The North Carolina law also prohibits prepayment penalties and balloon payments for most 
covered loans. But the law also prohibits the financing of credit life, disability, 
unemployment, or other life and insurance premiums, while HOEPA included them only as 
part of the trigger calculation.  
 
While most states followed the North Carolina example by expanding the coverage and 
restrictions associated with HOEPA, there is substantial variation in the laws.  In an attempt to 
quantify the differences in the local laws, we created an index.  The higher the index, the 
stronger the law is.  In addition, the index can be broken down into two components.  The first 
component reflects the extent that the law extends market coverage beyond HOEPA.  The 
second component reflects the extent that the law restricts or requires specific practices on 
covered loans.  Table 1 summarizes the construction of the law index.  The full index is the 
sum of all the assigned points as defined in Table 1 and the coverage and restrictions indexes 
are the sum of points assigned in each subcategory. 
 
The coverage category includes measures of loan purpose, APR first lien, APR higher liens, 
and points and fees.  In general, if the law does not increase coverage beyond HOEPA it is 
assigned zero points.  Higher points are assigned if the coverage is broader.  In each category 
the highest points are assigned when all loans are covered.  For example, points assigned for 
loan purpose range from zero to four and the highest point total (four) indicates that the law 
covers all loan purposes.  The points assigned for extending first lien APR trigger ranges from 
zero to three depending on how low the trigger is.  For example, 7 percent triggers are 
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assigned one point while 6 percent triggers are assigned two points.  In addition, laws that do 
not have a first lien trigger are assigned three points.  A similar scheme is used to assigned 
points for higher lien triggers and the points and fees triggers.  In general, if the law includes 
multiple triggers within a category the most stringent trigger is used to assign the points.
 7
   
The restrictions index includes measures of prepayment penalty restrictions, balloon 
restrictions, counseling requirements, and restrictions on mandatory arbitration.  If the law 
does not require any restrictions then zero points are assigned.  Higher points indicate more 
restrictions.  For example, laws that do not restrict prepayment penalties are assigned zero 
points, while laws that prohibit all prepayment penalties are assigned four points.  Laws that 
prohibit or restrict the practice more quickly are assigned higher points.  For balloon 
restriction, the points vary from zero for no restrictions to four when the law prohibits all 
balloons.
8   The last two restrictions measure whether the law requires counseling before the 
loan is originated or restricts fully or partially mandatory arbitration clauses.  
 
Table 2 reports the calculated full (law) index, the coverage index, and the restrictions index 
for each law identified as being in effect by the end of 2004.  The average law index is 10.16, 
varying from 4 in Florida, Maine, and Nevada to 17 in New Mexico and Cleveland.  The 
coverage index and the restrictions index have a mean just over 5.  The coverage and 
restrictions indexes are only modestly correlated at 0.19.  This indicates that, while laws that 
increase coverage more also tend to increase the restrictions more, the relationship is very 
                                                 
7 For example, some laws have different triggers depending on loan amount or other distinctions. 
8 The law in Cleveland was determined to be restrictive and was assigned four points despite not neatly falling 
into any of the categories. 
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noisy.  Therefore, there are laws that increase coverage without increasing restrictions 
(Nevada) and other states that extend restrictions more than coverage (Florida). 
 
Scaled indexes are created and reported in Table 3.  This is necessary because the magnitude 
of each subcomponent of the index implicitly weights the index so that it represents some 
subcomponents more than others.  To help correct for this, each subcomponent number is 
scaled so that the maximum value equals one (actual/max).  It is then divided by the category 
mean value [(actual/max)/mean(actual/max)] so that each category has a mean of one. 
Therefore, the scaled index equally reflects each subcomponent in terms of marginal impacts 
and the level of the index.  Since eight categories are used to create the law index the mean 
value of the index is by design eight.  Zero also retains the appealing intuition of reflecting no 
increase in law strength beyond HOEPA.  The scaled law index varies from 17.16 to 1.47 and 
the scaled and original law index are highly correlated (0.87).  
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Table 1: Law Index Definition 
Category  Description of Law Index 
Coverage:    
 
Loan Purpose  
HOEPA equivalent=0,  
all loans except no government loans=1,  
all loans except no reverse or open loans=2,  
all loans except no reverse, business, or construction loans =3, and  
all loans with no exceptions=4 
 
APR Trigger 1st Lien 





APR Trigger Higher Liens 






Points and Fees Trigger 





Restrictions:   
Prepayment Penalty 
Prohibitions 
No restriction=0,  
prohibition or percent limits after 60 months=1,  
prohibition or percent limits after 36 months=2,  
prohibition or percent limits after 24 months=3, and 
no penalties allowed=4 
Balloon Prohibitions 
No restriction =0,  
no balloon if term<7 years (all term restrictions) =1,  
no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage =2,  
no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage and Cleveland=3, and 
no balloons allowed=4 
Counseling Requirements  Not required=0, and 
Required=1 
Mandatory Arbitration 
Limiting Judicial Relief 
Allowed=0,  
partially restricted=1, and  
prohibited =2 
Note: The law index is calculated by summing all categories.  The coverage and restrictions indexes 
are created by summing the subcategories. 
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Arkansas 8  5  3 
California 11  7  4 
Chicago, IL  15  10  5 
Cleveland, OH  17  7  10 
Colorado 13  8  5 
Connecticut 10  5  5 
Cook County, IL  15  10  5 
Florida 4  0  4 
Georgia 16  6  10 
Illinois 13  6  7 
Indiana 11  4  7 
Kentucky 9  2  7 
Maine 4  4  0 
Maryland 8  7  1 
Massachusetts 14  6  8 
Nevada 4  4  0 
New Jersey  10.5  5.5  5 
New Mexico  17  7  10 
New York  10  6  4 
North Carolina  11  3  8 
Ohio 6  4  2 
Oklahoma 8  2  6 
Pennsylvania 7  4  3 
South Carolina  9  4  5 
Texas 8  2  6 
Utah 6  4  2 
Washington, DC  15  8  7 
Wisconsin 5  3  2 
Average 10.16  5.13  5.04 
Standard Deviation  4.03  2.39  2.82 
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Arkansas 10.06  2.73  7.33 
California 7.07  5.09  1.98 
Chicago, IL  12.64  10.20  2.43 
Cleveland, OH  15.19  4.35  10.84 
Colorado 16.19  12.87  3.31 
Connecticut 6.92  2.73  4.20 
Cook County, IL  12.64  10.20  2.43 
Florida 1.98  0.00  1.98 
Georgia 14.88  4.13  10.76 
Illinois 17.16  8.73  8.43 
Indiana 7.55  2.36  5.19 
Kentucky 4.95  0.74  4.22 
Maine 1.47  1.47  0.00 
Maryland 10.51  5.84  4.67 
Massachusetts 9.68  4.13  5.55 
Nevada 1.47  1.47  0.00 
New Jersey  6.27  3.13  3.14 
New Mexico  12.91  6.28  6.63 
New York  6.82  4.13  2.69 
North Carolina  5.07  1.11  3.96 
Ohio 2.38  1.47  0.90 
Oklahoma 4.59  0.74  3.85 
Pennsylvania 2.92  1.47  1.44 
South Carolina  8.83  2.36  6.47 
Texas 3.79  0.74  3.06 
Utah 2.55  1.47  1.08 
Washington, DC  14.89  10.50  4.39 
Wisconsin 2.63  1.55  1.08 
Average 8.00  4.00  4.00 
Standard Deviation  4.98  3.52  2.87 
Note: The Coverage and Restrictions Indexes are modestly correlated (0.21). 
 
Literature on Local Predatory Lending Laws 
Research on the impact of predatory lending laws has been primarily focused on the impact of 
the North Carolina law.  Various data sets, both publicly available and privately held, have 
been used for analysis.  However, regardless of the method and author affiliations, the North 
Carolina law was found to have a significant impact on the flow of credit.   
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Papers by Ernst, Farris, and Stein [7] and Quercia, Stegman, and Davis [22, 23] use tables of 
mortgage conditions before and after the North Carolina law became effective, or in effect, 
and compares these metrics with growth rates in nearby states and the nation as a whole.  
Using the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data set and a list of subprime lenders 
created by HUD, Ernst, Farris, and Stein [7] find that the volume of loans originated did 
decline relative to the rest of the U.S.  However, using data leased from a private data vendor 
called LoanPerformance (LP), Quercia, Stegman, and Davis [22] find no volume impact on 
purchases or low credit score loans.  However, they do find some evidence that interest rates 
are higher on average, refinance activity declines, and the prevalence of prepayment penalties 
is lower; but the impact on balloons and high loan-to-value loans is mixed. Using the same 
data, Quercia, Stegman, and Davis [23] find that the decline in volume in North Carolina was 
largely associated with refinancing loans.  The LP data set differs greatly from the HMDA 
data because it provides much more detail about loan characteristics and is very expensive to 
lease for one year (over $100,000).  In addition, the LP data likely does not provide a 
complete picture of the subprime mortgage market because it includes only loans that are 
securitized.  If loans of better quality (A- rated) or pricing tend to have higher rates of 
securitization, then the LP data represent only one segment of the subprime market.  
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross [5] show that the rate of foreclosures, as reported by 
the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA), shows different time series 
properties than the LP data and was on average almost three times the LP foreclosure rate.  
Therefore, for the purpose of volume comparisons, HMDA is the preferred source because of 
its better market coverage. 
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Harvey and Nigro [13, 14] and Elliehausen and Staten [6] go beyond univariate tables  and 
estimate multivariate equations to identify the impact of the laws in North Carolina, Chicago, 
and Philadelphia. Since publication the Philadelphia law is no longer in effect.  On both 
Harvey and Nigro papers a proprietary version of HMDA along with the HUD subprime 
lender list is used while Elliehausen and Staten use proprietary loan information provided by 
nine members of the American Financial Services Association (AFSA).  AFSA has been an 
active participant in legal challenges of local predatory lending laws and represents some of 
the largest subprime lenders (Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Conseco Finance Corporation, 
Countrywide Home Loans, Equity One, CitiFinancial, Household Finance Corporation, Key 
Consumer Real Estate, Washington Mutual Finance and Wells Fargo Financial, Inc.).  All 
three papers include explanatory variables that control for location and borrower 
characteristics, as available.  Harvey and Nigro estimate at the loan level the probability of 
applying for a subprime loan, originating a subprime loan, and being rejected on a subprime 
application in a logit estimation.  Elliehausen and Staten count the number of originations up 
to the county level and create a panel data set from 1995 through 2000 and estimate a negative 
binomial regression on all observed originations covering the whole U.S.  
 
Despite these many methodological and data source differences, all three multivariate papers 
find evidence that the introduction of the North Carolina law substantially reduced the flow of 
credit in the subprime mortgage market.  Consistent with the simple theory of a market 
without considering any lemons issues, the reduction in flow was attributed more to a 
reduction in applications than an increase in rejections. In addition, low-income areas and 
households tended to have larger declines. 
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Data Design, Identification, and Probit Estimation 
To examine whether the experience in North Carolina is typical we use the publicly available 
version of HMDA in conjunction with the HUD subprime lenders list.
9  Any loan application 
or origination associated with a lender on the list is identified as a subprime loan.  All other 
loans are treated as not-subprime, that is, as a conventional loan.  Because it is impossible to 
fully characterize borrower and location characteristics, the sample is reduced to include only 
locations where a new predatory lending law has been introduced and other locations that are 
physically nearby.  The locations where the law comes into effect can be viewed as the 
treatment group and locations where no new law comes into effect can be viewed as the 
control group.
10  Therefore, only counties that border other states without a local predatory 
lending law are used for the treatment group.  The control group includes only counties in 
neighboring states that border the treatment state and do not have a predatory lending law in 
effect during the examined time period (the year before and after the introduction of the law).  
This contrasts with other studies (Harvey and Nigro [14], Elliehausen and Staten [6]) that 
have used the whole of the U.S. or regions to define both control and treatment groups.  To 
help remove the impact of any temporary reaction to each law and any market reaction prior 
to the law coming into effect, only the year before and the year after the law is in effect are 
included in the sample.  This approach should help to increase the comparability of the 
                                                 
9 http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html, accessed on 2/1/05. HUD generates a list of subprime lenders 
from industry trade publications, HMDA data analysis, and phone calls to the lender confirm the extent of 
subprime lending.  Since this list is defined at the lender level, loans made by the subprime lenders may include 
both prime and subprime loans.  In addition, subprime loans made by predominately prime lenders will also be 
incorrectly identified as prime lending.  Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the loans identified using the 
HUD subprime lender list is that it identifies the extent of specialized subprime lending -- not full-service 
lending.  
10 This geographically based sampling does not create a “matched” sample, where one similar loan in the 
treatment location is matched with another loan in the control location.  In short, all observed loans in the 
specified location and time periods are included. 
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treatment group and the control group because they are geographically closer and, as a result, 
likely to be more economically similar than full state and region comparisons.   
 
This approach and HMDA availability reduce the sample to ten local predatory lending laws: 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
Identification Strategy 
To identify the impact of a local predatory lending law, the location and timing of the law 
becoming effective, along with borrower and location characteristics, are included.  Table 4 
describes the variables and data sources.  Similar to Harvey and Nigro [13, 14], three separate 
dependent variables will be tested for impacts of local predatory lending laws --  the 
probability of applying for a subprime loan, the probability of originating a subprime loan, 
and the probability of being rejected on a subprime application.   
 
The key variable of interest is Ineffect.  This variable indicates that a loan is in a location 
when and where a predatory lending law is effective.  It is defined as zero before the law is 
effective, even in the treatment location, and is always zero in the control location.  Ineffect is 
constructed by interacting the variable Law, which indicates locations where the law will 
eventually be in effect, and Postlaw, which indicates the time period after a law has become 
effective.  Therefore, Law identifies the treatment location and Postlaw identifies the time 
period the treatment is in effect.  The reference group is defined as locations where the law 
will never be in effect in the time period before the law is in effect.  There are no priors 
regarding the coefficients on Law or Postlaw, because they will capture prevailing 
  22 
probabilities associated with location and time that are not controlled for by other variables.  
Given the results from prior research we would expect Ineffect to be negative for the 
application and origination outcome and potentially insignificant for the rejection outcome.  
 
Table 4: Identification Strategy and Control Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition  Source 
 Outcome      
Application  Indicator variable = 1 for subprime application; 0 
for prime 
HMDA & HUD 
subprime lender list 
Origination  Indicator variable = 1 for subprime origination; 0 
for prime 
HMDA & HUD 
subprime lender list 
Rejection  Indicator variable = 1 if subprime loan is denied; 
0 if accepted 
HMDA & HUD 
subprime lender list 
Identification    
Law  Indicator variable = 1 if borrower is from a 
location with a law at some point; 0 otherwise 
Working Paper : 
Appendix A* 
Postlaw  Indicator variable = 1 for post-legislation time 
period; 0 otherwise 
Working Paper : 
Appendix A* 
Ineffect   Interaction of Law and Postlaw indicators 
indicating that the borrower is from a location 
with a law currently effective. 
Working Paper : 
Appendix A* 
Control Variables     
Income   Borrower's gross annual income ($ in thousands)  HMDA 




Relinc  Ratio of tract median family income to MSA 
median family income  
HMDA 
Minority   Tract's minority population percentage  HMDA 
Vacant  County's percentage of vacant housing units  Census 2000 
Population   County's population growth from the calendar 
year before and after the law became effective 
Census Bureau 
Unemployment   County's unemployment rate  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
* Ho and Pennington-Cross [15] provide a detailed description of each law in Appendix A. The 
detailed descriptions of the laws are too long to include in this paper and have been summarized by the 
law index discussed above. 
 
Both Harvey and Nigro [13, 14] and Elliehausen and Staten [6] include a series of control 
variables associated with the location of the loan or loan application and the borrower because 
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they may impact the demand or supply of subprime credit.  In general we expect that 
borrowers will be more likely to use/apply for subprime loans (and perhaps be rejected by 
subprime lenders in locations) with difficult economic conditions and when borrowers have 
lower income or are in minority areas (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter [3] and Pennnington-
Cross [20]).  Economic conditions are proxied by the county unemployment rate, housing 
vacancy rate, and population growth rate. Borrower characteristics are proxied by the percent 
of minority population in the census tract and borrower income.  In general, we expect that 
applicants with more income relative to their loan amount will have an easier time meeting 
prime underwriting requirements.  Underwriting requirements are proxied by the loan-to-
borrower-income ratio.  One important caveat to this analysis is that the borrower’s credit 
history or credit score, which has been shown to be a very important determinant of mortgage 
performance for both subprime and prime loans (Pennington-Cross [21]), is not reported in 
the HMDA data and therefore cannot be included in this analysis.  Lastly, perhaps due to 
minimum scale requirements, prime lending may be more available in locations with more 




A probit model is estimated for each outcome and for each law sample (treatment and control 
location loans).  Therefore, for each law, three probit models are estimated and a total of 30 
model estimates are generated including 10 explanatory variables each for a total of 300 
estimated coefficients excluding intercepts.   
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The probit specification is given by 
) ' ( ) | 1 Pr( β x x Y Φ = = , (5) 
where Y is the outcome (application, origination, or rejection), x is a vector of explanatory 
variables, β  is a vector of parameters, and  (.) Φ  denotes the standard normal distribution. The 
log-likelihood for the probit model is 




' β β ∑ ∑
= =




i x x L ,   (6)  
where   and   are, respectively, the observed values of outcome Y and explanatory 
variables x for observation i.   
i y i x
 
Due to the large number of coefficient estimates, instead of reporting all coefficients, 
summary information is provided.
11  To provide context for the marginal effects, Table 5 
reports the mean of the dependent variables for each of the law samples (control and treatment 
loans).  It shows that there is a wide variety in subprime application, origination, and rejection 
rates.  For example, subprime applications ranged from almost 25 percent in California to just 
over 15 percent in Maryland.  The relative magnitude of application and origination rates 
provides indirect support for the high rates of rejection on subprime applications.  In fact, in 
some of the law samples, over 50 percent of subprime applications were rejected. 
 
Table 6 reports the marginal impact of a local predatory lending law becoming effective for 
each state and each outcome.  Consistent with prior literature, these results indicate that the 
North Carolina law did reduce the flow of subprime credit through a reduction in both 
application and origination probabilities.  But the experience in terms of originations and 
applications in North Carolina is replicated in only one-half of the laws examined.  In the 
                                                 
11 Detailed results are available upon request. 
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other half the introduction of the law was associated with an increase in the flow 
(originations) of subprime credit.  The results are also mixed in terms of applications, with 
some laws being associated with higher and other laws associated with lower probabilities of 
application. The impacts of the local laws on the probability of being rejected are a little more 
consistent, with seven of the ten laws being associated with lower rejection rates. 
Table 5: Mean of Dependent (Outcome) Variables 
Law sample  
(treatment and control loans)  Application Origination Rejection 
California 0.249  0.153  0.354 
Connecticut 0.245  0.119  0.397 
Florida 0.177  0.063  0.574 
Georgia 0.224  0.097  0.505 
Massachusetts 0.174  0.080  0.357 
Maryland 0.153  0.064  0.439 
North Carolina  0.233  0.111  0.484 
Ohio 0.241  0.092  0.551 
Pennsylvania 0.261  0.109  0.476 
Texas 0.242  0.104  0.550 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects of Ineffect Variable 
Law Sample  Application  Origination Rejection 
California  0.032*** 0.067***  -0.258***
Connecticut  0.014** 0.023***  0.013 
Florida  -0.030*** 0.008*  -0.057***
Georgia  -0.056*** -0.007**  -0.110***
Massachusetts  -0.074*** -0.032*** -0.030***
Maryland  0.029*** 0.018***  -0.066***
North Carolina  -0.069*** -0.042*** -0.048***
Ohio  -0.005 -0.004 -0.022** 
Pennsylvania  0.037*** 0.032*** 0.032***
Texas  0.189*** 0.107*** 0.148* 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% levels respectively. 
Table 7 provides a summary of coefficient estimates for the remaining control variables for 
the probit application, origination, and rejection models.  The first four columns report the 
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minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the estimated coefficients across the 
ten laws.  The last column reports the mean t-statistic associated with the coefficients.  There 
is no expected sign or even significance associated with the Law and Postlaw dummy 
variables since they control for unobserved impacts of location and time in each law sample.  
There are three measures of income included in the model (borrower income, the ratio of the 
requested loan amount to borrower income, and the ratio of tract to MSA median family 
income).  As anticipated, on average, borrowers with higher income are less likely to apply 
for or get a subprime loan and are less likely to be rejected on a subprime application.  
However, as with most of the control variables, there is substantial variation in the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates.  Consistent with the findings for borrower income, 
originations and applications are more likely to occur in locations with relatively lower 
incomes, and applications are more likely to be rejected when they come from locations with 
relatively lower incomes.  Lastly, as anticipated, applicants requesting larger loans relative to 
their income are more likely to be rejected. 
 
Higher unemployment rates are also associated on average with higher probabilities of 
application, origination, and rejection, but the coefficient estimates vary from being negative 
to positive.  In addition, weaker housing markets, proxied by the vacancy rate and county 
population growth, are inconsistently associated with application, origination, and rejection 
probabilities.   However, consistent with prior research, locations with more minorities are 
associated with higher subprime application, origination, and rejection probabilities.  
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Table 7: Summary of Control Variable Coefficient Estimates 
 Coefficient    T-stats 
Variable    Min   Max   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean 
Application Results 
Law -1.191  0.500 -0.032  0.447  2.621 
Postlaw -0.254  0.156 -0.078  0.120  -8.530 
Ineffect -0.288  0.765 0.031  0.299  -1.639 
Income -0.319  -0.058 -0.176  0.083  -34.463 
Loan2inc -0.001  0.032 0.012  0.012  9.622 
Relinc -0.617  -0.215 -0.431  0.165  -41.554 
Minority 0.274  0.819 0.550  0.153  35.074 
Vacant -10.514  15.820 -0.207  6.704  -3.124 
Population -0.119  0.059 -0.018  0.053  -5.243 
Unemployment -5.393  16.539 7.503  6.453  13.972 
Origination Results 
Law -0.807  0.230 -0.079  0.293  -1.223 
Postlaw -0.509  0.067 -0.158  0.170  -8.510 
Ineffect -0.229  0.759 0.103  0.279  1.999 
Income -0.497  -0.039 -0.213  0.159  -19.529 
Loan2inc -0.033  0.031 -0.002  0.018  -2.871 
Relinc -0.615  -0.141 -0.388  0.156  -22.270 
Minority 0.384  0.820 0.605  0.141  24.624 
Vacant -9.833  4.701 -1.604  3.791  -4.108 
Population -0.128  0.026 -0.022  0.055  -2.545 
Unemployment -5.246  18.093 6.891  6.623  9.131 
Rejection Results 
Law -0.377  1.837 0.197  0.599  3.088 
Postlaw -0.263  0.321 -0.006  0.168  -0.194 
Ineffect -0.469  0.373 -0.084  0.223  -3.927 
Income -0.082  0.051 -0.031  0.043  -4.660 
Loan2inc 0.001  0.055 0.022  0.017  7.779 
Relinc -0.395  -0.018 -0.190  0.108  -9.553 
Minority -0.038  0.242 0.125  0.087  3.447 
Vacant -18.268  6.909 0.736  7.194  3.552 
Population -0.033  0.098 0.016  0.040  0.407 
Unemployment -7.209  26.239 1.147  9.270  -0.646 
 
These results do not provide any indication that predatory lending laws systematically reduce 
the flow of subprime credit.  However, the results do show that predatory lending laws may 
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be associated with lower rejection rates of subprime mortgage applications.  It can be 
expensive just to apply for a mortgage: the non-refundable application fee usually runs from 
$200 to $300, not to mention other hidden or non-pecuniary costs. Thus, while reducing 
rejection rates may not have been the primary purpose of the laws, a reduction in rejections 
can represent substantial savings to consumers. 
Understanding the Heterogeneity of Market Responses 
The previous section followed prior literature and estimated the impact of a local lending law 
one law at a time. While the findings for the North Carolina law sample were largely 
replicated the results showed that other laws did not always have the same impact.  In fact, 
some laws were associated with relative increases in the flow of credit.  This section tests to 
see if the heterogeneity in market responses is related to the nature or strength of the local 
law.   
 
Table 8 presents the correlation between the impact of a local law, measured as the percent 
change in the probability of the outcome, and the scaled law indexes described previously.  
Stronger laws are correlated with reductions in application, origination, and rejection 
probabilities.  In addition, law coverage is more highly correlated with declines in rejection 
rates than the extent of restrictions.  This provides some preliminary evidence that stronger 
laws may be associated with larger declines in the flow of credit, while simultaneously being 
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Table 8: Correlation of Law Strength and Outcome  
  Percent Change When Law Becomes In Effect 
Scaled Law Index  Application Origination  Rejection 
Full Index  -0.35  -0.30  -0.08 
Coverage Index  -0.30  -0.26  -0.58 
Restrictions Index  -0.30  -0.26  -0.08 
 
This section provides a more complete analysis by pooling all the law samples together and 
including the scaled law indexes as explanatory variables.
12  To maintain the identification 
strategy, law sample (each law’s treatment and control loans) dummies are included and the 
variables Law and Postlaw are interacted with each law sample, with the North Carolina law 
sample as the excluded group.  The impact of the average law can then be interpreted directly 
from the Ineffect variable. 
 
If the outcome (subprime application, subprime origination, or subprime rejection) and the 
treatment are jointly determined, we must also be concerned with factors that could impact the 
probability of a location choosing to enact a predatory lending law.  The HUD-Treasury 
report indicated that predatory lending primarily is found in subprime lending and not prime 
lending.  Therefore, we would expect states with more subprime lending to be more likely to 
elicit requests from victims of predation and consumer advocacy groups for legislative 
remedies.  In addition, predatory lending has also been associated with urban and African-
American populations.  Therefore, again we should expect that locations with more urban 
populations and nonwhite populations would be more likely to seek legislative restrictions on 
subprime lending.  Lastly, since the predatory lending laws are crafted by state legislatures, 
                                                 
12 To enhance computational feasibility, we only include a 10 percent random sample of each location in the pool 
sample. We also estimate using the 25 and 50 percent random samples and find that results are robust across 
sample sizes. 
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either Republicans or Democrats may be more or less likely to respond to predatory lending 
concerns through legislation.  Table 9 provides a description of the variables used to identify 
whether the state where the property is located will enact a local predatory lending law.  
Table 9: Variable Definitions – Treatment Equation 
Variable Definition  Source 
Law  Indicator variable = 1 if borrower is from a 
location with a law at some point; 0 otherwise 
Working paper : 
Appendix A* 
Mktshare  State's market share of subprime loans, lagged one 
year 
Calculated from 
HMDA and HUD’s 
subprime lender list 
Urban  State's urban population percentage  Census 2000 
Nonwhite  State's nonwhite population percentage  Census 2000 
Politics  Ratio of democrats to republicans in state 
legislatures, 2000 
2002 Statistical 
Abstract of the US 
* Ho and Pennington-Cross [15] provide a detailed description of each law in Appendix A.  
Tables 10a and 10b provide descriptive statistics of the variables by outcome.  The application 
sample includes over 590,000 prime and subprime loan applications; the origination sample 
includes over 390,000 prime and subprime originations; and the rejection sample includes 
over 89,000 subprime applications, which are either accepted or rejected.
13   
 
As shown in Table 10, just over 20 percent of the applications were subprime, while only 9.7 
percent of the originations were subprime.  Consistent with the relative magnitude of 
applications and originations, the average rejection rate is very high for our sample of 
subprime loans: 42.9 percent.  The states in the sample are best described as urban, majority 
white, and predominately with the Democratic Party in the state legislature.  The borrowers 
and applicants typically have loans approximately twice the size of their income.  In addition, 
as expected, the income of subprime applicants (rejection sample includes rejects and accepts 
                                                 
13 The rejection sample excludes loans whose application was withdrawn by applicant or whose file was closed 
for incompleteness.  
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of subprime loans only) is substantially lower than for the overall sample (application and 
origination samples include both subprime and prime loans), and subprime applications come 
from census tracts with a higher concentration of minority households.  The law sample 
dummy variables indicate that the Maryland sample is the largest proportion of the pool 
sample and the Texas sample is the smallest.  In addition, the number of loans either before or 
after a law becomes effective varies by location and approximately 40 percent of the overall 
sample has a law in effect. 





sample Rejection  sample 
Variable  Mean  
Std. 
Dev  Mean  
Std. 
Dev  Mean  
Std. 
Dev 
Application  0.205  0.404  --- --- --- --- 
Origination  ---  --- 0.097  0.296 ---  --- 
Rejection  --- --- --- ---  0.429  0.495 
Mktshare  10.0%  2.8% 9.7% 2.7%  10.5%  2.7% 
Urban  81.7% 12.4% 82.0% 12.1% 82.2% 12.6% 
Nonwhite  26.6% 10.8% 26.6% 10.7% 27.4% 11.1% 
Politics  2.370 1.790 2.415 1.818 2.232 1.673 
Income  (thousands  $)  80.8 109.5 87.4 108.5 64.0  65.4 
Loan2inc  2.054 3.993 2.043 2.057 2.062 2.548 
Relinc  1.106 0.321 1.134 0.326 1.019 0.287 
Minority  24.5% 24.1% 23.5% 23.1% 30.3% 27.4% 
Vacant 8.5%  7.0%  8.2% 7.1% 9.1% 6.2% 
Population  1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 
Unemployment  4.7% 2.3% 4.6% 2.3% 5.0% 2.3% 
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sample Rejection  sample 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Law  0.631 0.482 0.627 0.484 0.666 0.472 
Postlaw  0.623 0.485 0.646 0.478 0.597 0.490 
Ineffect  0.397 0.489 0.410 0.492 0.407 0.491 
ca  0.215 0.411 0.208 0.406 0.277 0.447 
ct  0.039 0.193 0.037 0.188 0.041 0.199 
fl  0.040 0.196 0.039 0.192 0.036 0.186 
ga  0.052 0.221 0.049 0.216 0.060 0.238 
ma  0.186 0.389 0.199 0.399 0.143 0.350 
md  0.289 0.453 0.318 0.466 0.214 0.410 
nc  0.070 0.254 0.059 0.235 0.085 0.279 
oh  0.060 0.238 0.054 0.226 0.071 0.258 
pa  0.039 0.193 0.030 0.171 0.059 0.236 
tx  0.011 0.105 0.008 0.090 0.014 0.116 
lawca  0.197 0.398 0.190 0.392 0.261 0.439 
lawct  0.010 0.100 0.009 0.097 0.010 0.099 
lawfl  0.029 0.166 0.027 0.163 0.026 0.159 
lawga  0.024 0.154 0.024 0.152 0.026 0.160 
lawma  0.135 0.342 0.148 0.356 0.094 0.292 
lawmd  0.144 0.351 0.152 0.359 0.122 0.327 
lawnc  0.029 0.168 0.023 0.150 0.038 0.192 
lawoh  0.036 0.186 0.031 0.174 0.047 0.212 
lawpa  0.026 0.160 0.021 0.143 0.040 0.196 
lawtx  0.002 0.040 0.001 0.035 0.001 0.038 
postlawca  0.136 0.343 0.133 0.340 0.188 0.391 
postlawct  0.025 0.157 0.025 0.157 0.025 0.155 
postlawfl  0.024 0.153 0.024 0.153 0.021 0.143 
postlawga  0.029 0.167 0.029 0.167 0.031 0.175 
postlawma  0.128 0.334 0.143 0.350 0.085 0.278 
postlawmd  0.185 0.389 0.207 0.405 0.133 0.339 
postlawnc  0.036 0.186 0.032 0.177 0.041 0.198 
postlawoh  0.032 0.176 0.029 0.169 0.037 0.189 
postlawpa  0.021 0.143 0.017 0.129 0.029 0.169 
postlawtx  0.007 0.081 0.005 0.073 0.007 0.086 
Sample size  590,543   394,198   89,536  
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Estimation Strategy 
For each of the outcomes, the dependent variable is binary.  We use the probit model 
specification, which limits the estimated probabilities between zero and one and assumes a 
standard normal probability distribution.  However, we must also consider the possibility that 
the probability of the outcome occurring is jointly determined with the probability of the state 
enacting a law.  As noted by Greene [11] one approach is to estimate a bivariate probit model 
and allow the error terms to correlate between the two equations.  Specifically, we jointly 
model the probability of the loan being in a location that enacts a predatory lending law and 
the probability of subprime application/origination/rejection. The model specification is given 
by 
otherwise   0   , 0   if   1 ,
1 1 1 1 1 1 > = + =
∗ ∗
i i i i i X π π ε β π  (7a) 
otherwise   0   , 0   if   1
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 > = + + =
∗ ∗
i i i i i i X π π ε γ π β π  (7b) 
and 
[ ] [ ] 0
2 1 = = i i E E ε ε , 
[ ] [ ] 1
2 1 = = i i Var Var ε ε , 
[ ] ρ ε ε =
2 1, i i Cov . (8) 
Equation (7a) models the probability of loan i being in a state that enacts a predatory lending 
law ( ) as a function of state characteristics, . Equation (7b) models the probability of 
the outcome (application, origination, or rejection) for loan i ( ) as a function of loan and 
borrower characteristics, , and the endogenous law indicator variable,  . The error 
















Maddala [18] and Greene [12] showed that in the bivariate probit model, if the two dependent 
variables are jointly determined, the inclusion of an endogenous variable on the right-hand 
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side of the second equation can be ignored when constructing the log-likelihood. The log-
likelihood function for our seemingly unrelated bivariate probit is given by 
( ) ∑ Φ =
i
i i w w L ρ , , ln
2 1
2 , (9) 
where   denotes the standard bivariate normal cumulative density function,  (.) 2 Φ
( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 β π i i i X w − = , and  ( ) ) ( 1 2
1 2 2 2 2 γ π β π i i i i X w + − = . The function is maximized by 




We estimate the model specified in equations (7), (8), and (9) using maximum likelihood. 
Table 11 provides the estimated coefficients, the standard error of the estimate, and the 
marginal impact of each variable at a specified interval and evaluated at the mean of all other 
variables.
14  Table 11 contains four panels (a-d).  To aid comparison across outcomes, each 
panel provides the results for all three outcomes (application, origination, and rejection).  
Panel (a) provides the results for the treatment equation. Panel (b) provides the results for the 
control variables in the outcome equations.  Panel s(c) and (d) provide the results for the 
identification variables used in the outcome equations.  
 
In panel (a), consistent with the HUD-Treasury report, the results show that states are more 
likely to introduce and pass legislation in locations with more urban and nonwhite 
households.  States with Republican dominated legislatures have tended to be more likely to 
be states with predatory lending laws.  Locations with more subprime lending are also 
associated with a higher probability of enacting a law.  In addition, the results are consistent 
across the three samples associated with each outcome. 
                                                 
14 See Appendix for details on the calculation of marginal effects in the bivariate probit model. 
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Table 11: Bivariate Probit Results – Base Model 
Panel (a): Treatment (Law) Equation 
 
Variable  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Marg. Eff.  Unit 
   Application Model 
Intercept -12.300***  0.043  ---  --- 
Mktshare 3.467***  0.101  0.0463 10% 
Urban 14.744***  0.055  0.1450  10% 
Nonwhite 2.670***  0.035 0.0359  10% 
Politics -0.197***  0.002  -0.0266  1 
   Origination Model 
Intercept -13.533***  0.059  ---  --- 
Mktshare 3.701***  0.131  0.0241 10% 
Urban 16.039***  0.075  0.0734  10% 
Nonwhite 3.128***  0.046 0.0205  10% 
Politics -0.188***  0.003  -0.0125  1 
   Rejection Model 
Intercept -10.290***  0.098  ---  --- 
Mktshare 1.073***  0.254  0.0176 10% 
Urban 12.964***  0.126  0.1369  10% 
Nonwhite 2.158***  0.083 0.0344  10% 
Politics -0.258***  0.005  -0.0449  1 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated as the discrete change in probability as a variable deviates from 
its sample mean by an appropriate unit. The chosen units are reported in the last column. 
 
The results in panel (b) largely meet expectations that location, borrower, and mortgage 
information indicting economic stress are positively associated with the probability of 
applying for a subprime loan.  For instance, subprime applications are positively associated 
with lower borrower income, higher loan-to-income ratios, lower-income census tracts, higher 
concentrations of minority populations, lower population growth rates, and higher 
unemployment rates.  However, subprime applications are negatively associated with higher 
vacancy rates.  This may partly reflect the need of many subprime applications to have 
substantial equity in their home to compensate for weak credit history. 
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Table 11: Bivariate Probit Results – Base Model (continued) 
Panel (b): Outcome Equation – Control Variables 
Variable  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Marg. Eff.  Unit 
   Application Model 
Intercept -0.409***  0.021  ---  --- 
Income -0.165***  0.004  -0.0047  $10,000 
Loan2inc 0.001**  0.000  0.0000  10% 
Relinc -0.420***  0.008  -0.0120  10% 
Minority 0.431***  0.012  0.0127  10% 
Vacant -0.346***  0.101  -0.0099  10% 
Population -0.012***  0.002  -0.0034  1% 
Unemployment 1.740***  0.243 0.0051  1% 
Corr. Coeff. (ρ) -0.329***  0.014  ---  --- 
Log likelihood  -368,685 
   Origination Model 
Intercept -0.895***  0.033  ---  --- 
Income -0.131***  0.007  -0.0022  $10,000 
Loan2inc -0.016***  0.002  -0.0003  10% 
Relinc -0.335***  0.013  -0.0056  10% 
Minority 0.546***  0.019  0.0096  10% 
Vacant -0.707***  0.166  -0.0115  10% 
Population 0.004*  0.002  0.0007  1% 
Unemployment 1.450***  0.389 0.0025  1% 
Corr. Coeff. (ρ) -0.236***  0.021  ---  --- 
Log likelihood  -183,048 
   Rejection Model 
Intercept -0.011  0.048  ---  --- 
Income -0.048***  0.008  -0.0019  $10,000 
Loan2inc 0.020***  0.003  0.0008  10% 
Relinc -0.256***  0.020  -0.0101  10% 
Minority 0.007  0.026  0.0003  10% 
Vacant 0.855***  0.246 0.0340  10% 
Population -0.017***  0.004  -0.0068  1% 
Unemployment 1.189**  0.579 0.0047  1% 
Corr. Coeff. (ρ) -0.134***  0.030  ---  --- 
Log likelihood  -68,018 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated as the discrete change in probability as a variable deviates from 
its sample mean by an appropriate unit. The chosen units are reported in the last column. 
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The results for originations are very similar to the application results.  Again, in general, 
indicators of economic stress (borrower income, lower-income census tracts, minority status, 
and unemployment rates) are associated with higher probabilities of originating a subprime 
loan.  However, higher vacancy rates, lower population growth rates, and higher loan-to-
income ratios are all negatively associated with subprime origination probabilities.  Again, the 
vacancy results may indicate the need for housing equity in the underwriting of subprime 
loans to compensate for other weaknesses in the loan application.  In addition, consistent with 
the population growth results, Pennington-Cross [20] found that subprime loans were the 
largest part of the mortgage market in locations where economic conditions were stressful but 
improving. 
 
The results for the rejection equation also show that in general more adverse economic 
conditions (lower borrower income, higher loan-to-income ratio, lower-income census tracts, 
higher property vacancy, declining population growth, and higher unemployment rates) are all 
associated a higher probability of rejection.  In addition, the results cannot find a statistically 
significant relationship between minority presence and the probability of being rejected. 
 
Panel (c) includes control variables for the time period before and after the law is in effect as 
well as indicators of each law sample (control and treatment loans or applications).  The 
excluded law sample is North Carolina so that coefficients should be interpreted as relative to 
the North Carolina law sample.  However, there are no priors on the sign, magnitude, or 
statistical significance of these variables.  The coefficients on law sample dummy variables 
(for example, ca, ct, fl, ga, and others) are additive with the intercept, which represents the 
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intercept for the North Carolina law sample.  In addition, all the interactions of each state’s 
law sample with the variables Law and Postlaw (for example, lawca, postlawca, lawct, 
postlawct, lawfl, postlawfl, and others) are additive relative to the variables Law and Postlaw, 
which represents the North Carolina law sample.  While all the variables included in panel (b) 
do control for many factors, the variables in panel (c) control for all unobserved 
characteristics associated with the time period (pre-law versus post-law), law sample (law 
sample dummy variables), and the endogenously determined location (control locations 
versus treatment locations).  
 
The main variable of interest is the Ineffect variable.  This coefficient indicates whether the 
introduction of the law has had any impact on the application, origination, or rejection of 
subprime loans on average.  The coefficient estimates are negative and significant at the 99 
percent level in the application equation and rejection equation, and insignificantly different 
from zero in the origination equation.  
 
To aid in economic interpretation, panel (d) provides estimates of the marginal impact of each 
of the identification variables.  The marginal impacts can be interpreted as percentage point 
changes from the mean.  Therefore, the impact of the variable Law is a 12.4 percentage point 
(coefficient = 0.124) increase in the probability of applying for a subprime loan relative to the 
average application rate of 20.5 percent.  The average impact of a local predatory lending law, 
using the variable Ineffect, is a reduction of 4.9 percentage points in the probability of being 
rejected (mean = 42.2 percent), and a decrease of 1.7 percentage points in applying (mean = 
20.3 percent). These results indicate that the average local predatory lending law is associated 
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with only a small or statistically insignificant change in the probability of applying for or 
originating a subprime loan, while at the same time a substantial reduction in the probability 
of being rejected on a subprime loan.  Therefore, the previously observed substantial 
reduction in the flow of credit found in North Carolina is not typical. 
Table 11: Bivariate Probit Results – Base Model (continued) 
Panel (c): Outcome Equation – Identification Variables 
   Application Origination  Rejection 
Variable  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. 
Law 0.973***  0.058  0.941*** 0.098  0.091  0.120 
Postlaw -0.051**  0.021  -0.267*** 0.035  0.279***  0.048 
Ineffect -0.034***  0.011  0.000  0.017  -0.119***  0.026 
ca -0.686***  0.033  -0.665*** 0.052  -0.065  0.074 
ct -0.073***  0.028  -0.133*** 0.045  -0.079  0.060 
fl -0.089***  0.033  -0.204*** 0.055  0.067  0.078 
ga 0.155***  0.026  -0.049  0.042  0.309***  0.057 
ma 0.069***  0.022  0.063*  0.035  -0.093*  0.049 
md -0.380***  0.019  -0.443*** 0.031  -0.009  0.045 
oh -0.167***  0.024  -0.309*** 0.040  0.234***  0.054 
pa 0.038  0.028  0.141*** 0.045  -0.093  0.057 
tx 0.047  0.034  0.131**  0.060  0.104  0.073 
lawca -0.157***  0.056  -0.230**  0.095  0.089  0.111 
lawct -0.574***  0.050  -0.685*** 0.084  0.254**  0.112 
lawfl -0.861***  0.065  -0.855*** 0.110  0.181  0.140 
lawga -0.533***  0.050  -0.572*** 0.084  0.135  0.113 
lawma -0.781***  0.049  -0.864*** 0.084  -0.050  0.107 
lawmd -0.502***  0.051  -0.679*** 0.087  0.249**  0.103 
lawoh -0.325***  0.049  -0.400*** 0.083  0.012  0.109 
lawpa -0.343***  0.047  -0.465*** 0.080  0.129  0.104 
lawtx -0.883***  0.080  -0.748*** 0.134  0.135  0.181 
postlawca 0.175***  0.025  0.459*** 0.040  -0.579***  0.056 
postlawct -0.067**  0.031  0.244*** 0.050  -0.564***  0.072 
postlawfl 0.157***  0.032  0.246*** 0.054  -0.107  0.074 
postlawga -0.020  0.031  0.261*** 0.052  -0.487***  0.069 
postlawma -0.157***  0.026  0.060  0.042  -0.393***  0.059 
postlawmd 0.045*  0.024  0.317*** 0.039  -0.461***  0.054 
postlawoh 0.078***  0.028  0.306*** 0.047  -0.252***  0.063 
postlawpa 0.051*  0.029  -0.053  0.049  0.001 0.064 
postlawtx -0.015 0.047  -0.024 0.082  -0.311***  0.102 
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Table 11: Bivariate Probit Results – Base Model (end) 
Panel (d): Outcome Equation – Marginal Effect for Identification Variables 
Variable Application  Origination Rejection
Law 0.124  0.084  -0.052 
Postlaw -0.015  -0.048  0.110 
Ineffect -0.017  -0.032  -0.049 
ca -0.166  -0.088  -0.026 
ct -0.021  -0.021  -0.031 
fl -0.025  -0.031  0.026 
ga 0.047  -0.008  0.123 
ma 0.020  0.011  -0.037 
md -0.103  -0.068  -0.003 
oh -0.045  -0.044  0.093 
pa 0.011  0.026  -0.036 
tx 0.014  0.024  0.041 
lawca -0.104  -0.089  0.036 
lawct -0.148  -0.094  0.101 
lawfl -0.191  -0.103  0.072 
lawga -0.145  -0.087  0.053 
lawma -0.207  -0.128  -0.018 
lawmd -0.152  -0.122  0.099 
lawoh -0.102  -0.077  0.004 
lawpa -0.099  -0.072  0.051 
lawtx -0.201  -0.103  0.054 
postlawca 0.038 0.073  -0.221 
postlawct -0.017 0.044  -0.209 
postlawfl 0.046  0.044  -0.042 
postlawga -0.008  0.046 -0.192 
postlawma -0.046  0.006  -0.152 
postlawmd 0.015  0.059 -0.179 
postlawoh 0.022 0.054  -0.099 
postlawpa  0.015 -0.018 -0.002 
postlawtx -0.005 -0.012 -0.122 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated as the discrete change in 
probability as the variable is increased from 0 to1, while holding all 
other variables at their mean. 
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Results – Strength of the Law 
While the average law may have only modest impacts on the flow of credit, it may be that 
relatively more stringent laws may have a larger impact.  In general it is expected that 
stronger laws should be associated with larger reductions in applications and originations due 
to tighter lending standards.  In addition, stronger laws may reduce rejections by deterring 
marginal applications or through increased screening by lenders to ensure law compliance. 
 
To gauge the potential relevance of a law’s strength, we estimated two additional models. 
Model II replaces the Ineffect variable with the scaled law index as an explanatory variable in 
the outcome equation, and Model III replaces the full law index with the disaggregated law 
index along the dimensions of coverage and restrictions. The results (coefficient, standard 
error, and marginal effects) are reported in Table 12.
 15  
Table 12: Bivariate Probit Results – Augmented Models with Scaled Local Law Index 
 
   Model II  Model III 
Variable  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Marg. Eff.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Marg. Eff. 
   Application Results 
Law index  -0.005***  0.001  -0.0067  ---  ---  --- 
Coverage index   ---  ---  --- 0.054***  0.005  0.0584 
Restriction index  ---  ---  ---  -0.059***  0.005  -0.0454 
   Origination Results 
Law index  -0.001  0.002  -0.0006  ---  ---  --- 
Coverage index   ---  ---  --- 0.050***  0.009  0.0337 
Restriction index  ---  ---  ---  -0.049***  0.008  -0.0218 
   Rejection Results 
Law index  -0.016***  0.003  -0.0318  ---  ---  --- 
Coverage index   ---  ---  ---  -0.016  0.013  -0.0215 
Restriction index  ---  ---  ---  -0.017  0.011  -0.0191 
Note: Marginal effects for the indexes are estimated as change in probability as an index deviates from 
its mean by one standard deviation. Means and standard deviations are as reported in Table 3.  
                                                 
15 To conserve space all the control variables are not reported, but are available on request.  In addition, 
specification tests were conductied including both the variable Ineffect and the laws indexes.  In all cases the 
Ineffect variable was insignificant and is not reported. 
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In Model II, the coefficient estimates indicate that stronger laws are associated with lower 
probabilities of applying for a subprime loan and being rejected on a subprime application.  
However, law strength had no impact on the probability of originating a subprime loan.  
Again, the magnitude of the impact on the probability of applying is very small.  For example 
the marginal impact, measured by a one-standard-deviation increase in the index from the 
mean, is only -0.67 percentage points in the application equation.  In contrast, the marginal 
impact is much larger for rejection (-3.18 percentage points).  This is highlighted in Figure 4, 
which plots the change in the probability of the outcome (apply, originate, and reject) relative 
to the strength of the law.   
Figure 4 

















































Note: All other variables are set to their mean and the law index is increased from 0 to the maximum observed 
value using Model II. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 5 percent probability.  
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The strength of the law can also be measured along the dimensions of coverage and 
restrictions. Assuming the market does not have a significant lemons problem, the impact of 
restrictions should be unambiguous.  If appropriate substitutes cannot be found, more 
restrictions on allowable lending should lead to less lending because lenders are required to 
tighten lending standards, which reduces the number of eligible applicants. Therefore, 
originations should be lower for stronger laws and likely applications will be deterred due to 
the reduced availability of loan types.  In Model III, as illustrated in Figure 5, the coefficients 
results indicate that laws with more restrictions are associated with reduced probabilities of 
applying and originating subprime loans.  For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the scaled restrictions index reduces the probability of applying by 4.5 percentage points and 
the probability of originating by 2.2 percentage points.  
Figure 5 
















































Note: All other variables are set to their mean and the restrictions index is increased from 0 to the maximum 
observed value using Model III. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 5 percent probability.  
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The impact of increased coverage of a law, after controlling for restrictions, is largely an 
empirical question.  If there is no lemons problem in the subprime market, more coverage 
should unambiguously reduce applications and originations.  However, if potential applicants 
are deterred from applying because of fear of being taken advantage of by dishonest  lenders 
or do not apply because of the cost of sorting the honest from the dishonest, then the 
introduction of a law that covers more application may help to increase applications by 
reducing the fear of predation and the cost of detection.  Model III in Table 12 reports that 
laws with broader coverage tend to be associated with increased originations and applications. 
In fact, the coefficient estimates are very similar in magnitude, although they have the 
opposite signs, to the impact of stronger restrictions.  The marginal impact of a one-standard-
deviation increase in coverage increases the probability of applying for a subprime loan by 5.8 
percentage points and the probability of originating a subprime loan by 3.4 percentage points.  
This result provides some support for the theory that negative press on predatory lending in 
the subprime market has suppressed demand for the product due to fear of being taken 
advantage of.  As illustrated in Figure 6, when a law is passed that covers your loan 
application, even if it restricts lending very little, the household is more willing to make an 
application.  In other words, consistent with a market with a lemons problem, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, the demand for subprime credit can actually increase when a predatory lending law 
is enacted.  The largest increase is possible for laws with few restrictions but broad market 
coverage. 
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However, there is no statistically significant evidence that the make-up of the law has any 
impact on the probability of being rejected.  Instead, it is the overall strength that is associated 
with lower rejection probabilities.    
Figure 6 




















































Note: All other variables are set to their mean and the coverage index is increased from 0 to the maximum 
observed value using Model III. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 5 percent probability. 
 
Conclusion 
Starting with North Carolina in 1999, states and other localities across the U.S. have 
introduced legislation intended to curb predatory and abusive lending in the subprime 
mortgage market.  These laws usually extend the reach of the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, 
lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers and prohibiting and/or 
restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties on covered loans. 
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While prior literature found evidence that the North Carolina law did reduce the flow of 
credit, the results in this paper indicate that the typical law has little impact on the flow of 
subprime credit as measured by loan origination and application.  However, rejections do 
decline by over 10 percent for the typical law.  The reduction in rejections may reflect less 
aggressive marketing, additional pre-screening by lenders, increased self-selection by 
borrowers, or other factors.  While a reduction in rejection rates may not have been the intent 
of the predatory lending law, it does indicate that borrowers are benefiting by saving non-
refundable application costs when rejected for a subprime loan.   
 
However, not all local predatory lending laws are created equal.  The results indicate that the 
heterogeneity in law strength can help further explain the mechanisms that make one law 
decrease the flow of credit and another actually increase the flow of credit.  The strength of 
the law is measured along two dimensions – coverage and restrictions.  Some laws provide 
broad coverage of the subprime market (Colorado) and others very little coverage (Texas). 
Some have substantial restrictions (Georgia) on allowable lending, while others have very few 
restrictions (Maine).  The results indicate that coverage and restrictions tend to have opposite 
impacts.  In general, laws with more extensive restrictions are associated with larger decreases 
in the flow of credit.  In fact, laws with the strongest restrictions can decrease applications by 
over 50 percent.  In contrast, laws with broad coverage can increase applications by even 
more than 50 percent.  Therefore, although on the surface local predatory lending laws seem 
to have little impact, the design of the law can stimulate the subprime market, depress the 
subprime market, or leave volumes relatively steady but with lower rejection rates.  As a 
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result, the design of the law can have economically important impacts on the flow and make-
up of the mortgage market. 
 
In future research it would be helpful to determine how product mix adjusts to the 
introduction of these laws.  For example, the laws make no distinction between initial interest 
rates on fixed rate and adjustable interest rate loans.  But adjustable rate loans tend to have 
lower initial rates, resulting in substitution rather than fewer loans, and can include teaser 
terms that temporarily reduce the rate below the benchmark.  Therefore, adjustable rate loans 
may be one way to avoid the trigger APR levels in predatory lending laws and shift a 
borrower out from under the protective coverage of the regulations.  There also may be a 
regulatory burden associated with these laws that needs to be passed on to consumers through 
higher interest rates and upfront fees. Lastly, these laws may reduce the availability of the 
secondary market leading to liquidity issues in the subprime market, which may also increase 
the cost of credit. 
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Appendix: Marginal Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model 
As Greene [10] documented, the calculation of marginal effects in the general bivariate probit 
model is quite involved. It is further complicated by the presence of an endogenous variable 
on the right hand side of the second equation as well as interaction terms. We consider 
marginal effects for various types of variable in the model.   
 
First, consider the treatment equation (7a). In our model all the variables in   are 
continuous. Marginal effects are estimated by the discrete change in expected probability as a 
variable deviates from its mean by an appropriate unit. The bivariate probability is: 
1 X
(10)    ) , , ( ) , | 1 , 1 (
2 2 1 1
2
2 1 2 1 ρ γ β β π π + Φ = = = X X X X P
 
Second, consider the outcome equation (7b). The conditional mean function is: 
(11)   
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2
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π π π π π π π
− − Φ + + Φ =
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For a binary variable q in X
2, the marginal effect of q on π
2 is the discrete change in predicted 
values of π
2 as q switches from 0 to 1: 
(12)    ] 0 , , | [ ] 1 , , | [
2 1 2 2 1 2 = − = = q X X E q X X E Meff π π
 
For a continuous variable z in X
2, again, marginal effects are calculated as discrete change in 
probability, using the formula for expected probability specified in (10). 
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For the endogenous binary variable π
1, the marginal effect on π




) , , (
) (
) , , (
) | 0 (
) , | 1 , 0 (
) | 1 (
) , | 1 , 1 (
] 0 , , | [ ] 1 , , | [
1 1
2 2 1 1
2
1 1
2 2 1 1
2
1 1
2 1 2 1
1 1
2 1 2 1































= − = =
 
 
Now we consider interaction terms of the form π
1*q, where q is a binary variable in π
2. 
According to Norton, Wang, and Ai [19], the full interaction effect is the double difference.  
(14)   
]] 0 * , 0 , , , 0 | [ ] 0 * , 1 , , , 0 | [ [
]] 0 * , 0 , , , 1 | [ ] 1 * , 1 , , , 1 | [ [
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
= = = − = = = −
= = = − = = = =
q q X X E q q X X E
q q X X E q q X X E Meff
π π π π π π
π π π π π π
Intuitively, we first set π
1 to zero and calculate the change in probability as q changes its 
value from zero to one. We then do the same with π
1 set to one. The full interaction effect is 
the difference between these two quantities. The conditional probabilities are as in (13). 
 





2 are both binary variables in 
X
2, the full interaction effect is the double difference: 
(15)    
]] 0 * , 0 , 0 , , | [ ] 0 * , 1 , 0 , , | [ [
]] 0 * , 0 , 1 , , | [ ] 1 * , 1 , 1 , , | [ [
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
= = = − = = = −
= = = − = = = =
q q q q X X E q q q q X X E






2] is the conditional mean function specified in (7). 
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